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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040281CA

v,
C •R• ,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a juvenile court adjudication on one
count of wanton destruction of protected wildlife, a third degree
felony if committed by an adult

(R. 30-31) .

This court has

jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(c)(West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1.

Where the state established that the crime was committed

in Uintah County, did the trial court commit reversible error in
allocating to the juvenile the burden of proving that he was
Indian, in order to except himself from state jurisdiction?
2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the

juvenile, who called himself a Uintah Band member of the Indians

of Utah Territory, was not legally Indian and was, therefore,
subject to state jurisdiction?

j

Trial court jurisdictional rulings are reviewed for
correctness.

State v. Nones, 2000 UT App 211, 15,

11 P.3d 709 (citing State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Viiil, 784 P.2d

4

1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)).
3.

Did the trial court properly reject mistake of law as a

defense to the destruction of protected wildlife where the
written opinions on which the juvenile purportedly relied either
did not fall within the purview of the statute governing mistake
1
or were not legally relevant to the crime charged?
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed for
correctness, according no deference to the trial court ruling
i

below.

State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992), overruled

on other grounds. State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106 (Utah
2003); State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 345, 16, 57 P.3d 1134.
4.

1

Did the trial court properly reject the defense of

infancy to a juvenile court adjudication?
"Whether a defense is without merit is a question of law
that we review for correctness."

Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930

P.2d 1206, 1211 (Utah App. 1997).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4 (West 2004), governing penalties
for wanton destruction of protected wildlife, provides that:
(1) A person is guilty of wanton destruction
of protected wildlife if that person:
-2-

i

(a) commits an act in violation of . .
Section 23-20-3(1);

(c) (i) does so with intentional,
knowing, or reckless conduct . . .

(3) Wanton destruction of wildlife is punishable:
(a) as a third degree felony if:

(ii) a trophy animal was captured,
injured, or destroyed.
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-3 (West 2004), governing taking or
transporting protected wildlife, provides in pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided in this title or a
rule, proclamation, or order of the Wildlife
Board, a person may not:
(a) take. . .
(i) protected wildlife or their parts;

(b) transport . . . protected wildlife or
their parts;
(d) possess protected wildlife . . .
unaccompanied by a valid license, permit,
[or] tag . . .
(2) Possession of protected wildlife without
a valid license, permit, [or] tag . . . is
prima facie evidence that the protected
wildlife was illegally taken and is illegally
held in possession.

-3-

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304(2) (West 2004), governing mistake
of law, provides in pertinent part:
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the
existence or meaning of a penal law is no
defense to a crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or
mistake, the actor reasonably
believed his conduct did not
constitute an offense; and
(b) His ignorance or mistake
resulted from the actor's
reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of
the law contained in a written
order or grant of permission by an
administrative agency charged by
law with responsibility for
interpreting the law in question;
or
(ii) A written interpretation
of the law contained in an opinion
of a court of record or made by a
public servant charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the
law in question.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The juvenile was originally charged by petition in juvenile
court with one count of wanton destruction of protected wildlife,
a class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult (R. 174). The
juvenile filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (R.
155, 118-52).

After extensive briefing on issues related to

jurisdiction, the court denied the motion (R. 32 at addendum A ) .
The juvenile was tried to the court, which determined that the
petition was true (R. 22-24 at addendum B).

Disposition was

stayed, pending the outcome of this timely appeal (R. 7; R. 24 at
addendum B ) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During the 2002 deer hunt, a truck pulled up to a checkpoint
near the Book Cliffs in Uintah County where the Utah Division of
Wildlife Resources was checking for chronic wasting disease (R.
2: 11). There was a large mule deer buck in the truck bed, but
no state hunting tag attached to the animal (Id. at 12, 22) . The
juvenile and his son, as well as two other relatives, were in the
truck (IcL at 16).
The juvenile told a conservation officer that he had killed
his first deer (Id. at 22).

His father corroborated that the boy

was the shooter (Id. at 25).
Based on this evidence, the juvenile was charged by petition
in juvenile court with wanton destruction of wildlife (R. 2-3).
Before trial, the petition was amended to a third degree felony
if committed by an adult because the animal was a trophy deer,
statutorily defined as "any buck with an outside antler
measurement of 24 inches or greater."
2(46)(a)(West 2004).

Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-

The parties stipulated to the size of the

antler spread (R. 27). The juvenile a motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction, accompanied by a lengthy pre-trial memorandum
(R. 118-55).

After the motions had been briefed, heard, and

denied, the juvenile stood trial, and the court found the
petition to be true (R. 22-24).

The court stayed disposition

-5-

pending the outcome of this timely appeal (R. 7; R. 24 at
addendum B).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The juvenile has organized his lengthy appellate brief into
three issues and six sub-issues, with 14 sub-parts included
within the sub-issues, 2 sub-sub-parts, and 4 sub-sub-sub-parts.
See Br. of Aplt. at i-iii.

In the interests of efficiency and

clarity, the state has reframed the juvenile's claims.
First, the juvenile court did not err in ruling that the
juvenile must carry the burden of proving his Indian status in
order to defeat state court jurisdiction.

Once the state

established that the crime occurred in Uintah County, it had
carried its burden of establishing jurisdiction.

The burden then

shifted to the juvenile to demonstrate an exception by showing a
particular reason why the federal courts should assume
jurisdiction instead.
Second, the trial court correctly ruled that the juvenile
was not Indian for the purpose of establishing an exception to
state criminal jurisdiction.

Where the juvenile conceded that

the crime occurred in Uintah County and where he did not adduce
evidence that would invoke the federal government's interest in
the special relationship it maintains with certain Indian people,
the state properly retained jurisdiction.

Nothing about the

juvenile's assertion that he is a Uintah Band member of the

Indians of Utah Territory or about the effect of the Utah
Partition Act changes this result.
Third, the trial court correctly refused to admit evidence
about the juvenile's alleged mistake of law in relying on a
resolution issued by the Ute Tribal Business Committee and on two
opinions issued by the Tenth Circuit for the belief that he was
excepted from the law forbidding hunting without a state permit.
This issue is inadequately briefed and, on this ground alone, the
Court may decline to consider it.

Even so, the argument fails

because the Ute Tribal Business Committee resolution fell outside
the purview of the mistake statute and the two cases on which the
juvenile purportedly relied were not relevant.

Consequently, any

reliance on them would have been unreasonable.
Finally, the juvenile seeks to invoke the "common law rule
of infancy" as a defense to the criminal charge of taking
protected wildlife without a state hunting permit.

Because the

juvenile's case was adjudicated in juvenile court - a civil court
exercising equitable powers only - and did not result in a
criminal conviction, the juvenile court correctly rejected his
claim of incompetency based on his youth.
ARGUMENT
The central issue the juvenile raises in his appellate brief
is jurisdictional in nature.

The law is well-settled that

subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by either
party or the Court.

State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 930 (Utah

-7-

1992)•

Plainly, "when subject matter jurisdiction does not

exist, neither the parties nor the court can do anything to fill
that void."

Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990)

(citation omitted).

This appeal focuses almost entirely on

jurisdictional issues raised prior to trial and concluding that
the juvenile court had jurisdiction.

Notably, the substantive

issue at trial, whether the juvenile wantonly destroyed protected
wildlife by shooting a trophy deer without a state hunting
permit, is not at issue on appeal.
POINT ONE
THE JUVENILE COURT CORRECTLY
CONCLUDED THAT THE JUVENILE MUST
CARRY THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING
HIS INDIAN STATUS; IN ANY EVENT,
BECAUSE IT WAS UNDISPUTED THAT THE
JUVENILE WAS 31/32 NON-INDIAN BY
BLOOD, ANY ERROR IN THE COURT'S
ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF
WAS HARMLESS
The juvenile argues that the trial court erred in ruling
that he must carry the burden of proving his Indian status in
order to defeat state court jurisdiction.
65; R. 32 at addendum A.

See Br. of Aplt. at

The juvenile's argument lacks merit.

The trial court reached a correct legal conclusion.

While

the state bore the initial burden of proving that the crime was
committed in Utah, once it established that fact, the burden then
shifted to the juvenile to establish that he fit within an
exception that would preclude the state from exercising
jurisdiction.

The issue of who bears the burden of proving that a
defendant or a victim is either Indian or non-Indian has been a
source of some debate among the federal circuits.

Although

courts disagree about who bears the burden of proving a defendant
is not Indian, they nonetheless seem to agree that, in order to
invoke federal jurisdiction for a crime committed in Indian
Country, the federal government must at least establish that
the defendant or the victim is Indian.1

either

Compare United

States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d at 971, 978 (10th Cir. 2001)
(federal government must prove the Indian/non-Indian status of
both the defendant and the victim because this status will
"determin[e] whether a federal court has jurisdiction" and under
what statute jurisdiction is derived); United States v. Torres,
733 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir. 1984)(government must prove not only
that defendants are Indian but also that victim was non-Indian)
with United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1222-23 (9th Cir.
2005)(federal government must prove the Indian status of either
defendant or victim, but need not prove non-Indian status of
either); United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir.
1983)(government need not allege non-Indian status of defendant
in an indictment under section 1152 and does not have burden of
going forward on that issue).

1

For a definition of "Indian Country," see 18. U.S.C.
§1151 at addendum E.
-9-

Under Utah law, it is clear that the state bears the burden
of establishing the trial court's jurisdiction over a defendant.
See generally State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah App.
1988)(in proving offense of consumption, state bore burden of
establishing jurisdictional factor that at least some alcohol was
consumed in Utah; failure to do so required reversal); see also
Newavs, Inc. v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 422-24 (Utah 1997)
(when faced with defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, state bore burden of establishing jurisdiction
under specific guidelines).
To establish a state trial court's authority to hear a case,
the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that some element of the charged offense was committed in Utah.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(1) (West 2005) (listing the various
methods by which a crime may be committed "wholly or partly
within the state," thereby subjecting the actor to state court
jurisdiction); see also State v. Pavne, 892 P.2d 1032, 1033 (Utah
1995) (applying preponderance standard to jurisdictional
questions, which must be decided by trial court rather than
jury).

If the state, then, shows by a preponderance of the

evidence that the offense was committed in Utah, it has met its
burden with regard to jurisdiction.

In this case, the parties

agreed and the trial court found that the crime was committed in
Uintah County (R. 22 at addendum B; R. 125).

-10-

Once the state establishes its jurisdiction, the burden
shifts to defendant to prove circumstances that would deny the
court of jurisdiction.

This view is buttressed by case law.

In

State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court
noted that "[defendant] carried his

burden

of factually

establishing that he has been 'recognized racially' as a Ute
Indian."

Id. at 933 (emphasis added).2

The legislative history of Utah's jurisdiction statute
further bolsters the correctness of Perank's statement that the
defendant must prove that he qualifies for an exception to.
jurisdiction.

Recognizing that the case law on this issue has

been less than clear, the legislature recently amended the
jurisdictional statute to "clarif[y] procedures for challenging
the state's jurisdiction to prosecute an offense."
General Session (2004) (enacted).

S.B. 119,

Under the amended statute,

once the state
establish[es] jurisdiction over the offense .
. . by showing . . . that the offense was
committed either wholly or partly within the
borders of the state, . . . the burden is
upon the defendant to prove, [that] defendant
2

This Court has ruled inconsistently on the issue. In
State v. Haqen, this Court cited Sorenson and held that "the
prosecution was required to prove jurisdiction, i.e., that
defendant was not an Indian, albeit only by a preponderance of
evidence." 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (reversed on
other ground). In contrast, three years earlier, another panel
held that "[defendant] had the burden to persuade the trial court
that he was an 'Indian' within the intended purview of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1152-1153." State v. Lucero, No. 860213-CA (Utah App. Aug.
27, 1987) (unpublished memorandum decision at addendum D). The
correctness of Haqen is undermined by Perank, cited above.
-11-

is an enrolled member of an Indian tribe . .
. and that the facts establish that the crime
is one that vests jurisdiction in tribal or
federal court.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(5) (West 2004).

While the statute was

amended after the present case arose, the legislature made clear
that its intent was to "clarify" the law rather than change its
essential nature.
Indeed, when the legislature adds a clarifying provision to
a statute, that provision generally takes retroactive effect.
See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 486 (Utah 1988) P[w]hen a
statute is amended, the amendment is persuasive evidence of the
legislature's intent when it passed the former, unamended
statute") overruled on other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889
P.2d 393 (Utah 1994); Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P.2d 144, 150-51
(Utah 1979); Okland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 520 P.2d
208, 210-11 (Utah 1974) (a statute or amendment that "deals only
with clarification or amplification as to how the law should have
been understood prior to its enactment" applies retroactively).
Moreover, placing the burden of proof on the juvenile
comports with the rule adopted in other states that have
addressed the issue.

See Arizona v. Verdugo, 901 P.2d 1165, 1168

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("we hold that the burden to show facts
that would establish the trial court's lack of jurisdiction,
because of exclusive federal jurisdiction under [§§ 1152 or
1153], is on defendant, not the state"); Pendleton v. Nevada, 734
P.2d 693, 695 (Nev. 1987) ("[o]nce the state produces evidence
-12-

that the crime took place in the county, it is incumbent upon the
defendant to prove that the incident took place on lands over
which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction"); New Mexico
v. Cutnose, 532 P.2d 896, 898 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) ("[t]he burden
was upon defendant to demonstrate a lack of jurisdiction in the
district court"); Oklahoma v. Klindt, 782 P.2d 401, 403 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1989) (disagreeing with defendant's argument that "he
has no affirmative duty to prove his status as an Indian" in
attempting to defeat state jurisdiction)/ Vermont v. St. Francis,
563 A.2d 249, 251 (Vt. 1989) (holding that defendant has "the
burden of proving they are Indians"); Washington v. Daniels, 16
P.3d 650, 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) ("person claiming to be
Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction must show (1) that
he is an Indian in the racial sense, and (2) that he is enrolled
or affiliated with a [federally-recognized tribe] and is
individually subject to United States jurisdiction").
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred
in finding that the juvenile must carry the burden of proving his
Indian status, the error was harmless.

"^Harmless' errors are

^errors which . . . are sufficiently inconsequential that we
conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error
affected the outcome of the proceedings.'"

State v. Hamilton,

827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Verder 770 P.2d
116, 120 (Utah 1989)).
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Here, there was no dispute that the juvenile was 31/32 nonIndian by blood.

See R. 32 at addendum A.

Thus, even if the

court erred in ruling that the juvenile must carry the burden of
proof, that alleged error would have made no difference to the
determination that he did not legally qualify as Indian.
Point Two, infra.

See

Consequently, any error in allocating the

burden of proof was harmless.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE JUVENILE, WHO CLAIMED TO
BE A SHOSHONE INDIAN OF UTAH
TERRITORY, WAS NOT LEGALLY INDIAN
FOR PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION AND WAS, THEREFORE,
SUBJECT TO STATE JURISDICTION
The juvenile's jurisdictional argument is multi-faceted and
complex.

Reducing the argument to its simplest terms, he asserts

that because he is Indian and the crime was committed in Indian
Country, the state cannot exercise jurisdiction over his case.
Jurisdiction over hunting and fishing in Indian Country, he
contends, rests exclusively with the federal government.

See Br.

of Aplt. at 20-23.3

3

This claim is incorrect ab initio. An Indian who is
charged with a criminal hunting violation may be subject to
tribal and/or federal jurisdiction. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(4);
United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 534
U.S. 1115 (2001) (Indian tribes have inherent criminal
jurisdiction over non-member Indians); 18 U.S.C. § 1165. The
incorrectness of the juvenile's assertion, however, is peripheral
here because the juvenile is not an Indian for purposes of
criminal jurisdiction.
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tribes.

That is, federal "regulation is rooted in the unique

status of Indians as *a separate people' with their own political
institutions.

Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore, is

governance of once-sovereign political communities." United
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977).

Thus, " w'in

dealing with Indians the Federal Government is dealing primarily
not with a particular race as such but with members of certain
social-political groups towards which the Federal Government has
assumed special responsibilities.'""

LaPier v. McCormick, 986

F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1993)(quoting United States v. Heath, 509
F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted)).
The federal government assumes these "special
responsibilities" only under specific circumstances.

For

example, where either the perpetrator or victim of a crime
committed in Indian Country meets the legal definition of Indian,
the federal interest in the crime and its consequences would
mandate federal jurisdiction and preclude state jurisdiction.4
See St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1459 (D.S.D.
1988) (citing D. Getches & C. Wilkinson, Federal Indian Law 41215 (2d ed. 1986)).

The state, in turn, exercises criminal

jurisdiction for crimes committed in Indian Country only when

4

The juvenile also tries to bootstrap into federal
jurisdiction by asserting that the "victim" of his crime was the
Ute Tribe. See Br. of Aplt. at 27-29. The juvenile, however,
has no standing to assert rights on the Tribe's behalf. Murdock,
132 F.3d at 542.
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The crime in this case was committed in Uintah County on
land that is "Indian Country."

See R. 22; 18 U.S.C. § 1151

(defining Indian Country) at addendum C.

Because the land on

which the crime occurred was Indian Country, the pivotal inquiry
for purposes of determining jurisdiction is whether the juvenile
meets the legal definition of Indian.

If he fails to qualify as

"Indian," then the state properly exercised jurisdiction.
The Court may find the following chart useful in
understanding how jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian
Country is allocated:
Crimes by Parties

Jurisdiction

1. By Indians against Indians:

2.

a.

"Major" crimes

b.

Other crimes

Federal or Tribal
(concurrent)
Tribal (exclusive)

By Indians against non-Indians:
a.

"Major" crimes

b.

Other crimes

. Federal or Tribal
(concurrent)
Federal or Tribal
(concurrent)
Tribal (exclusive)

3.

By Indians without Victims:

4.

By non-Indians against Indians:

5.

By non-Indians against non-Indians: State (exclusive)

6.

By non-Indians without Victims:

Federal (exclusive)

State (exclusive)

Canby, William, American Indian Law, 168 (3d ed. 1998).
Underlying all determinations of jurisdiction for crimes
committed in Indian Country is the nature of the relationship
between the federal government and federally-recognized Indian
-15-

Indian interests, which would implicate a federal responsibility,
are absent.

See State v. Sorkhabi, 46 P.3d 1071, 1073 (Ariz, Ct.

App. 2002) (state's jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian
Country by non-Indians in victimless crimes or against nonIndians "is based on the fact that Asuch crimes do not involve
essential tribal relations or affect the rights of
Indians'")(citation omitted).
A.

The juvenile is not Indian for purposes of criminal
jurisdiction over a crime committed in Indian Country.
The dispositive jurisdictional inquiry for a crime committed

in Indian Country begins with whether the juvenile meets the
legal definition of "Indian."5

If he does, then federal interests

are implicated and the state is precluded from exercising
jurisdiction.
For purposes of criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed
in Indian Country, the genesis of a test for determining whether
either a perpetrator or a victim is Indian was first articulated
in United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1846).

Through

subsequent state and federal court rulings, this analysis has
evolved into a two-part test:
"Two elements must be satisfied before it can
be found that [a defendant or victim] is
Indian under federal law. Initially, it must
appear that he has a significant percentage
5

The matter is inherently complex because the definition
of "Indian" may vary, depending on the context for which identity
as an Indian is relevant. State v. Perank, 858 P.2d at 927, 932
n.6 (Utah 1992)(citing Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian
Law 19-20 (1982).
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of Indian blood. Secondly, the [defendant]
must be recognized as an Indian either by the
federal government or by some tribe or
society of Indians." Goforth v. State, 644
P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. 1982).
State v. Haaen, 802 P.2d 745, 747 n.2, (Utah App. 1990), reversed
on other grounds, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 1992); accord Perank, 858
P.2d at 932. This test has been used by many courts, both
federal and state.

See, e.g., United States v. Prentiss, 273

F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kevs, 103 F.3d
758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996); Scrivner v. Tansv, 68 F.3d 1234, 1241
(10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th
Cir. 1995); United State v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir.
1984); St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1460 (D.S.D.
1988); State v. Sebastian, 701 A.2d 13, 23-27 (Conn. 1997); State
v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983, 986 (Mont. 1990); State v. Atteberv, 519
P.2d 53, 54 (Ariz. 1974); State v. Bonaparte, 759 P.2d 83, 85 (ID
Ct. App. 1988).
In this case, the trial court found that the juvenile
carried 1/32 Indian blood (R. 32 at addendum A ) .

In assessing

what quantum of Indian blood satisfies the first prong of the
Rogers test, most courts require at least 1/4 Indian blood.
Venzia v. United States, 245 F. 411 (8th Cir. 1917)(1/4 to 3/8
found sufficient); State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d at 986-87 (165/512
found sufficient); State v. Haoen, 802 P.2d at 747 (5/16 found
sufficient); Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 440 P.2d 442,
444 (Wash. 1968)(1/4 found sufficient); cf. Goforth v. State, 644
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P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (slightly less than 1/4
found insufficient).

Courts have differed on whether l/8th

Indian blood is sufficient to satisfy the first Rogers prong.
Compare Sully v. United States, 195 F.113, 117, 129 (8th Cir.
1912) (1/8 held sufficient) with Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d
77,80 (Wyo. 1982)(1/8 held insufficient).

The State could find

no cases holding that 1/32 Indian blood constitutes a
"significant amount" of Indian blood sufficient to fulfill the
first prong of the Rogers test.

Under the first prong of Rogers,

then, the juvenile does not carry a sufficient quantum of Indian
blood to qualify as an Indian for purposes of invoking a federal
interest in criminal jurisdiction.
The analysis need not go further.

The juvenile is not an

Indian under the accepted legal standard and the state,
consequently, has jurisdiction over his crime even though it
occurred in Indian Country.

An examination of the second Rogers

prong, while not necessary, further demonstrates how far the
juvenile is from qualifying as Indian for federal jurisdictional
purposes.
The second prong of the Rogers test, focusing not on race
but on recognition as an Indian by a tribe or the federal
government, was comprehensively analyzed in St. Cloud v. United
States, 702 F. Supp. 1456.

There, the court examined "whether

the Native American has a sufficient non-racial link to a
formerly sovereign people."

St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461.
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Reviewing existing case law, the St. Cloud court gleaned four
factors to analyze:
In declining order of importance, these
factors are: 1) enrollment in a tribe; 2)
government recognition formally and
informally through providing the person
assistance reserved only to Indians; 3)
enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation; and
4) social recognition as an Indian through
living on a reservation and participating in
Indian social life.
Id. at 14 61.

These factors, the court noted, are intended not to

establish "a precise formula," but rather to "guide the analysis
of whether a person is recognized as an Indian."

Id.

As to the first factor, enrollment in a tribe, juvenile
calls himself a Uintah Band member of the Shoshone Indians of
Utah Territory (R. 118, 123; Br. of Aplt. at 7, 10). While the
juvenile asserts membership in this group, he has not adduced any
proof either that the group in which he asserts membership is,
indeed, a tribal entity or that he is, in fact, a member of it.
The juvenile has thus failed to establish that he is "enrolled in
a tribe" for purposes of fulfilling the second prong of the
Rogers test.
Second, no evidence was adduced that the federal government
ever recognized the juvenile as Indian by providing him with
benefits or services reserved only for Indians.
Third, the only record evidence that the juvenile benefitted
from tribal affiliation of any sort was that he possessed a
Timpanogos Tribe hunting permit when he was apprehended with the
-20-

trophy buck (R. 23 at addendum B; R. 188). While the juvenile
may have claimed an association with the Timpanogos Tribe at some
time, he now claims only to be a Shoshone Indian of Utah
Territory (Br. of Aplt. at 7, 10). 6
The final factor is the juvenile's social recognition as an
Indian, including such considerations as living on a reservation
and participating in an Indian social lifestyle.

The record

contains no evidence to support this factor.
The record before this Court, then, does not support either
prong of the Rogers test.

The trial court thus correctly

concluded that the juvenile was not Indian for purposes of
federal jurisdiction (R. 32 at addendum A).

Accordingly, the

state properly exercised jurisdiction over his case.
B.

The juvenile's claimed affiliation as a Uintah Band member
of the Indians of Utah Territory does not provide him with
an independent, aboriginal right to hunt free from state,
tribal or federal jurisdiction.
The juvenile eschews the Rogers test, claiming instead that,

based upon his purported membership in the Uintah Band of the
Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory, he possesses an aboriginal
right to hunt, unregulated, in Indian Country.

The Uintah Band,

he claims, while eventually incorporating with two other bands to
become the Ute Indian Tribe, retained all the rights it formerly

6

And, indeed, claiming Timpanogos Tribe identification
would get him no further than his current claim. See Timpanogos
Tribe v. Conway, case no. 2:00-CV-734 TC, Order at 11 (January
25, 2005) (holding that Timpanogos Tribe has no legal identity
separate and apart from Ute Tribe) at addendum G.
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possessed as a separate Shoshone Band (Br. of Aplt. at 29-37).
The juvenile concludes that his right to hunt thus predates the
existence of the Ute Tribe and exists wholly apart from the Ute
Tribe, coming as it does from his Shoshone ancestors who were
Uintah Band members (Id. at 35-37).
The juvenile's argument was unequivocally rejected by the
federal courts in United States v. Murdock, 919 F.Supp. 1534 (D.
Utah 1996), aff'd, 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied,
Murdock v. United States, 525 U.S. 810 (1998). -In that case,
Perry Murdock, the son of two "mixed-bloods" terminated from the
Ute Indian Tribe under the Ute Partition Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677a
et seq., claimed the right to hunt and fish on the Reservation
because he was a member of the Uintah Band.
F.Supp at 1540-42; 132 F.3d at 540-41.

See Murdock, 919

In affirming the district

court's holding that Murdock did not retain aboriginal hunting
and fishing rights through the Uintah Band, the Tenth Circuit
held:
The [Ute Tribe's] Constitution thus makes
clear that the Bands ceased to exist
separately outside the Ute Tribe, that
jurisdiction over what was formerly the
territory of the Uintah Band was to be
exercised by the Ute Tribe, and that the
rights formerly vested in the Uintah Band
were to be defined by the Ute Constitution
and exercised by the Ute Tribe. In light of
these provisions, [Murdock's] argument that
the Uintah Band's hunting and fishing rights
retain a separate existence and belong only
to the Uintah Band is groundless. Even if
[Murdock] is correct that the Uintah Band
continues to maintain its own identity, under
the Ute Constitution the Band does so only
-22-

within the context of the Ute Tribe.
Accordingly, [Murdock] has no right of user
in hunting and fishing rights originally
granted to the Uintah Tribe.
Murdock, 132 F.3d at 541/ cf. Timpanoaos Tribe v. Conway, case
no. 2:00-CV-734 TC, Order at 11 (January 25, 2005) at addendum E
(citing favorably the testimony of two experts who concluded
"that the Timpanogos merged with the Utes many years ago, that
presently there is no separate tribe known as the Timpanogos
Tribe, . . . and that the Timpanogos, other than as members of
the Ute Tribe, have no rights on the Reservation").
The juvenile's claim, based on his membership as a Uintah
Band Shoshone Indian of Utah Territory, is similarly groundless.
Where the Uintah Band was formally incorporated into the Ute
Tribe, hunting and fishing rights originally accorded Uintah Band
members no longer retain a separate existence from the Ute Tribe.
Murdock, 132 F.3d at 541.

The juvenile's claim of a separate

hunting right premised upon the Uintah Band's retained aboriginal
rights thus fails for the same reasons Murdock's identical claim
failed before the federal courts.
C.

The issues that the juvenile briefs with respect to the Ute
Partition Act are not the subject of any trial court rulings
and, hence, are not properly before this Court for review.
Defendant devotes 19 pages of his appellate brief to various

arguments related to the Ute Partition Act which, ironically, he
describes at the outset as an analytical "red herring" to the
merits of his case.

See Br. of Aplt. at 40-59.
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Nowhere in his

brief does he connect his arguments with any trial court ruling.
And, indeed, a thorough review of all of the juvenile court's
rulings reveals not a single reference to the Ute Partition Act.
See R. 22-24, 32, 110-11.
Where defendant asserts that the Ute Partition Act is not
relevant to his case and where the juvenile court plainly did not
rely on it to reach its legal conclusions, there is nothing for
this Court to review.7
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED
MISTAKE OF LAW AS A DEFENSE TO THE
WANTON DESTRUCTION OF PROTECTED
WILDLIFE WHERE THE JUVENILE
PURPORTEDLY RELIED ON WRITTEN
STATEMENTS THAT EITHER DID NOT FALL
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE MISTAKE
STATUTE OR WERE NOT RELEVANT TO THE
CRIME CHARGED
The juvenile argues that the trial court erred when it
rejected his mistake-of-law defense and, consequently, refused to
allow evidence in support of what he claimed was his reasonable
but mistaken belief that he could hunt without a state permit.
See Br. of Aplt. at 59-62.

Specifically, he asserts he relied on

a resolution by the Ute Tribal Business Committee and on two
Tenth Circuit opinions.

Id.

7

The juvenile's claim is even more attenuated than his
father's identical claim, which fails on the merits. For a
complete discussion of the Ute Partition Act, the Court may
choose to reference the brief of appellee in State v. Reber,
Atkins & Thunehorst, case no. 20040371-CA.
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This argument fails at the outset for wholly inadequate
briefing.

Nowhere in his short appellate argument does the

juvenile articulate exactly how the mistake-of-law doctrine
applies to the facts.

The law is well-settled that "to permit

meaningful appellate review, briefs must comply with the briefing
requirements sufficiently to ^enable us to understand . . . what
particular errors were allegedly made, where in the record those
errors can be found, and why, under applicable authorities, those
errors are material ones necessitating reversal or other
relief.'" Burns v. Summerhouse, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App.
1996)(quoting Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah
App. 1988)).

The juvenile's argument fails because he has not

explained the asserted error in sufficient detail to enable this
Court to clearly understand its essential nature.
A further difficulty with the juvenile's appellate brief is
that he has framed his appellate argument as a due process claim.
See Br. of Aplt. at 61. The trial court, however, made no
mention of a constitutional basis for its ruling.

R. 32.

Because the trial court did not rule on constitutional grounds,
there is no constitutional ruling from which to appeal.

State v.

Richins, 2004 UT App 36, 18, 86 P.3d 759.
To the extent that the state has successfully gleaned the
meaning of the juvenile's mistake-of-law argument, it fails.

The

juvenile seems to assert that the juvenile court's rulings that
he was not Indian and that jurisdiction properly rested with the
-25-

state proved that he was mistaken in relying on two Tenth Circuit
opinions and on a Ute Tribal Business Committee resolution.8

Br,

of Aplt. at 62. Because these statements demonstrate his
^mistake'" of law, he asserts, they should trigger the
applicability of mistake as an affirmative defense to the charge
of wantonly destroying protected wildlife.

See Br. of Aplt. at

65-66 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304).
The juvenile's argument fails for two reasons: first,
because he sought to establish a mistake-of-law defense by
introducing testimony from the Ute Tribal Business Committee that
did not fit within the parameters of the statute governing
mistake; and, second, because the two Tenth Circuit cases on
which he relies are legally irrelevant.
The statute governing mistake of law provides that the
mistake must result from reasonable reliance on "a written
interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of
record" or on "[a]n official [written] statement of the law . . .
by an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility
for interpreting the law in question."

Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-2-

304(2) (b) (i)-(ii) .
First, the "law in question" is Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-3
(West 2004), governing the taking of protected wildlife, and Utah
8

The juvenile also asserts that he was relying on his
father. Br. of Aplt. at 59. But since his father was
purportedly relying on both the Tenth Circuit opinions and the
Ute Tribal Business Committee statement as well, this assertion
will not be dealt with as a separate matter.
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Code Ann. § 23-20-4 (West 2004), governing penalties for the
wanton destruction of protected wildlife.

The Ute Tribal

Business Committee, however, is not "an administrative agency
charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in
question."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304 (2) (b).(i) - (ii) . The

juvenile, consequently, could not invoke the Committee's
resolution as a defense to a criminal violation of that law.
Second, the juvenile purported to rely on two Tenth Circuit
cases, Timpanoaos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2002),
and Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 114 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1997).
Given the procedural posture and holdings of these cases,
however, they were legally irrelevant.

Consequently, any

reliance on them would have been patently unreasonable.
Timpanoaos Tribe was an interlocutory appeal from the denial
of the state's motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

286 F.3d at 1198.

In that context, a

panel of the Tenth Circuit determined that the Timpanogos Tribe
"may establish federal question jurisdiction in asserting its
hunting rights'' even though it was not a federally recognized
tribe.9

Id. at 1203-04.

This ruling merely permitted the suit to

continue; the court granted no other relief at that time.
1203-04.

Id. at

Defense counsel, intimately familiar with Conway

9

A "federally recognized tribe" is an Indian tribe
recognized by the United States Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Indian Affairs, as an Indian entity. The most recently
published list of federally recognized Indian tribes is found at
68 Fed. Reg. 68180 (Dec. 5, 2003).
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because he served as counsel on the case, fails to explain how or
why a ruling on a motion to dismiss caused him to reasonably
believe that he was exempt from state law forbidding hunting
without a state permit.

That issue had plainly not been

litigated when Conway was issued.10
Ute Indian Tribe, the other case on which the juvenile
purports to rely, addresses the boundaries of the Uintah Valley
Indian Reservation, attempting to resolve a conflict raised by a
United States Supreme Court decision that conflicted with an
earlier Tenth Circuit decision.
114 F.3d 1513.

See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah,

In this case, the trial court was never asked to

rule on any boundary issue, and there is no boundary issue
currently before the Court in this appeal.11
The juvenile has inadequately briefed the issue of mistake
of law for appellate review.

Moreover, he seeks to establish his

defense by relying on a proclamation that does not fall within
the ambit of the mistake statute and on written opinions that do

10

Subsequently, the federal district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, noting expert testimony
that the Timpanogos merged with the Utes and now have no rights
on the Reservation other than as Ute tribal members, and holding
that the Timpanogos have no legally cognizable aboriginal right
to hunt and fish on land reserved for the Ute Indians.
See addendum G at 1-2, 11.
11

The parties agreed that the deer was taken in Uintah
County, in Indian Country. The location was within the exterior
boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, in the southern
portion that was previously the Uncompahgre Reservation. It is
about 30 miles from the current Uintah Valley Reservation. R.
83-84.
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not support the propositions he asserts, much less the reasonable
reliance he claims.

For these reasons, the juvenile court

properly rejected his mistake of law defense.
POINT FOUR
THE COMMON LAW RULE OF INFANCY
CITED BY THE JUVENILE DOES NOT
APPLY TO A JUVENILE COURT
ADJUDICATION, WHICH IS A CIVIL
PROCEEDING THAT RESULTS NOT IN A
CONVICTION BUT IN CIVIL
ADJUDICATION
In a brief and largely undeveloped argument, the juvenile
asserts that, because of his youth, he is presumed incompetent to
commit a crime unless proven otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.
Br. of Aplt. at 62. The juvenile court dismissed this argument
summarily.

R. 32 at addendum A.

The court gave this argument its due.

The statute on which

the juvenile relies, governing persons under fourteen not being
criminally responsible, provides:
A person is not criminally responsible for
conduct performed before he reaches the age
of fourteen years. This section shall in no
way limit the jurisdiction of or proceedings
before the juvenile courts of this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-301 (West 2004).
In this case, the juvenile was not held criminally
responsible for any conduct occurring before he reached the age
of fourteen.

Indeed, he was not convicted of any crime.

Rather,

within the civil juvenile court system, a judge found that the
petition alleging he had unlawfully taken protected wildlife was
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true.

This juvenile adjudication is fundamentally different than

a conviction in adult criminal court.
The law is well-settled that "Utah's juvenile court
proceedings are civil in nature and are not intended to punish
youth."

In the matter of N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844, 851 (Utah App.

1989) (citations omitted).

Because the proceedings are civil,

they do not result in "convictions." Maintaining the civil
nature of juvenile court proceedings "furthers a reasonable state
interest in preventing youth offenders, who are still in their
formative years, from accruing a criminal record."

State v.

Schofield, 2002 UT 132, 516, 63 P.3d 667.
The Juvenile Court Act is explicit in ensuring the civil
nature of.its proceedings.

It clearly provides that, except in

cases involving the certification of serious youth offenders,
"proceedings in minor's cases shall be regarded as civil
proceedings with the court exercising equitable powers." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3a-117(l) (West 2004).

It further states: -"A minor

may not be charged with a crime or convicted in any court except
as provided in [the statutory sections governing serious youth
offenders,] and in cases involving traffic violations."

Id. at

§78-3a-117(3).
Because the juvenile's case was adjudicated in a civil
court, which exercised equitable powers, it did not result in a
criminal conviction.

He was not held criminally liable for his
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conduct.

Consequently, the juvenile court correctly rejected his

claim of incompetency based upon his youth.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the
juvenile's adjudication on one count of wanton destruction of
wildlife, a third degree felony if committed by an adult
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Addenda

Addendum A

EIGHTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
920 East Hwy 40
Vernal, UT 84078
(435) 789-9335

255 S State St
PO Box 1286
Roosevelt, UT 84066
(435) 722-0235

STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of

ORDER

COLTONREBER

Case Number: 170075

DOB: 12/30/88

Judge Larry A. Steele

21554 W 9000 S
PO Box 990
Duchesne, UT 84021
(435) 738-0105

Person(s) under eighteen years of age

This matter came before the Juvenile Court on the Minor's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Li
support of the minor's motion, the minor has filed extensive memoranda. In addition, the issues raised by the
minor have been extensively briefed and argued in the Eighth District Court in the parallel matter of the minor's
father who was charged with aiding and abetting the minor in the commission of the same offense. In response
to the minor's motion, the State has filed a memorandum and copies of the extensive briefs filed in and the
rulings filed by the District Court. After reviewing the new material filed by the minor and the pleadings and
rulingsfromthe District Court matter, the Court is ready to rule.
The State bears the burden of showing that the offense occurred within the boundaries of the State of Utah and
Uintah County, the minor has the burden to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that he is an "Indian" under
the Rogers test. One of the primary differences between this matter and the matter of the father in the District
Court is the degree to which the minor may have Indian blood. The father having 1/16 Indian blood through his
mother and no Indian blood through his father, the minor would have 1/32 Indian blood, not a sufficient degree
to make the minor an "Indian" for the purposes of jurisdiction. As ruled by the District Court and considering
the minor's status, the area in question is not within an area over which the Federal Government has exclusive
jurisdiction. The Court does not accept the minor's arguments on competence, mistake and other arguments as
a basis for lack of jurisdiction.
IT IS HEREBY THE ORDER that the minor's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is denied. The
matter shall proceed to trial as scheduled.
Filed: fsfaslrOlf}
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Addendum B

EIGHTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
920 East Hwy 40
Vernal, UT 84078
(435) 789-9335

255 S State St
PO Box 1286
Roosevelt, UT 84066
(435) 722-0235

STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of

ORDER

COLTONREBER

Case Number: 170075

21554 W 9000 S
PO Box 990
Duchesne, UT 84021
(435) 738-0105
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DOB: 07/07/2007
1/^
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Person(s) under eighteen years of age

This matter came before the Court for Trial on the above matter this 15th day of March, 2004. Present
vas the above minor, his father, mother, and counsel, Mr. Mike Hummiston; Mr. Ed Peterson, Deputy County
\ttorney and a number of witnesses and spectators.
Ed Johnson, Officer Terry Smith, and Johnny Reber were called as witnesses.
The minor renewed his objection to the jurisdiction of this Court. The issue of jurisdiction has been
previously ruled upon.
- The minor objected to the amended information. The information was amended to include that the
animal was a trophy animal because the rack was over 24 inches. The Court invited the minor to demonstrate
wherein he would be prejudiced by the amendment. He had notice of the statutory provision cited in the prior
Information. The deer antlers were available for examination by the minor and counsel. Counsel had even
stipulated to the width of the antlers being greater than 24 inches. The Court found there was no prejudice in
proceeding with the amended Information.
The Court offered to further consider any prejudice which the minor may identify during the trial and
reconsider the motion or bifurcate the proceedings and give the minor additional time to prepare to present any
additional evidence or matters. After the trial began, there was no discussion of further prejudice and no request
to bifurcate or for additional time to present further evidence or matters.
Having heard such oral testimony as the parties chose to introduce; examined the exhibits; heard oral
argument, the Court makes the following findings, based on the credible evidence and the reasonable inferences
to be drawn therefrom. The Court makes each of these findings beyond a reasonable doubt:
On or about October 27, 2004, Ed Johnson, a biologist of 17 years for the State of Utah, Division of
Wildlife Resources, was doing a chronic wasting disease study for deer at Duck Rock which is at the end of the
pavement at the south end of Bonanza Highway within Uintah County. A green Chevrolet or GMC pickup with
license # 473 JFN stopped and the occupants spoke to him. In the back of the vehicle was a buck Mule deer
which had large 3 point antlers. Mr. Johnson was familiar with Utah game licenses and tags. This deer did not
have a tag or permit. Mr Johnson asked the vehicle to follow him into the Vernal office of Wildlife Resource
Services. He met up with Officer Terry Smith at the intersection of Highway 40 and the Bonanza Highway and
continued on along with Officer Smith following into the Vernal office. He never lost sight of the deer until
Officer Smith took custody of the animal in Vernal. Officer Smith is a Conservation Officer for the Division of

Wildlife Resources and has been ^i officer for 16 years.
Officer Smith took custody of the deer, removed and put an evidence tag on the antlers, which antlers
have been in his continuous custody or in evidence lockers under his control ever since October 27, 2002. The
antlers were admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1. The parties stipulated a photograph shall be substituted for the
antlers. The parties stipulated that the "antlers which were attached to the buck mule deer taken by Officer
Terry Smith from the vehicle in which the Defendant was an occupant on the 27th day of October 2002 have an
outside antler measurement of 24 and 3/4 inches." Mule deer such as the one taken are protected wildlife. A
deer, such as this one, having a rack over 24 inches wide is a trophy animal.
After arriving at the vernal office, Officer Smith spoke to all occupants of the green pickup, Colton
Reber; his father, Rickie Reber; his uncle, Johnny Reber; and Johnny's grandson, Quintin Huber. Colton stated
to Officer Smith that this was his first deer. Officer Smith did not include this admission in his report. Mr.
Rickie Reber stated that his son, Colton, had shot the deer at about 5:00 PM that day. The father stated that the
deer was killed just east of Bitter Creek and the King's Well Road. Mr. Reber stated to Officer Smith that he
and his son had gone out hunting and his son, Colton, had killed his first deer. He was out there to assist Colton
hunt and was in the process of transporting the deer back to his brother's house. They were in his brother's
truck.
The conversation with Mr. Reber and son, Colton, took place approximately 8:00 PM in the evening on
October 27, 2002. The condition of the deer was consistent with the time of the kill and was consistent with the
manner in which Mr. Reber indicated the deer had been killed. Officer Smith is familiar with the boundaries of
Uintah County within the State of Utah and the area just east of Bitter Creek on King's Well Road is within
Uintah County. Officer Smith is familiar with the road all the way to Duck Rock (15-20 miles) all of which is
within Uintah County.
The hunters were not "100% sure" if they were legal or not, but argued that they had a right to hunt
there. They did not have a Utah permit. They did present a paper which said "Timpanogas Tribe Subsistence
Hunt 2002". The hunters stated they were members of the Timpanogas Tribe.
The uncle, Johnny Reber, was present during the hunt, but did not have Colton and Rickie always in
sight. He did not see Colton shoot the deer, but when he caught up with Colton and Rickie, they had the deer
and there was blood on Colton and Rickie from cleaning and transporting the deer.
The State asked the Court to make findings required by Utah vs. Pavne, 892 Pd 1032 (Utah 1995). The
offense occurred within the exterior boundaries of the State of Utah. The offense occurred within Uintah
bounty. The offense and required elements of the offense occurred outside the boundaries of the Ute Indian
•eservation and any other Indian reservation. As previously ruled, the minor would have 1/32 Indian blood, not
i sufficient degree to make the minor an "Indian" for the purposes ofjurisdiction. The area in question is not
vithin an area over which an Indian tribe or the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction. The area in
luestion is an area over which the State of Utah has jurisdiction.
The evidence was, for the most part, un-rebutted. The testimony of Johnny was presented and was
irgued by minor's counsel to raise a question as to who killed the deer. The testimony that Johnny did not keep
Bolton in sight and never saw Colton kill the deer, does little to rebut other evidence that Colton did kill the
leer. Johnny also testified that when he returned to the father and Colton, they had the deer and had blood on
hem. The Court credits the testimony of Ed Johnson and Officer Terry Smith. In evaluating their testimony,
he Court found them to be candid, truthful and largely un-rebutted. Officer Smith didn't include Colton's
dmission in his report, but he did include the father's admission. It appears to have been generally accepted,
yho killed the deer, Colton, the primary question and discussion related to jurisdiction.

The above minor, Colton ivdber, on or about tne z/~* aay 01 uciooei ^uwz, m umuui ^uum^, uunv ^x
Jtah, did commit Wanton Destruction of Protected Wildlife, an act in violation of UCA §23-20-4 and Section
> 3-20-3(1), a third degree felony, by shooting, injuring, killing, taking, possessing and transporting protected
vildlife. Colton possessed protected wildlife unaccompanied by a valid license, permit, tag, certificate of
egistration, bill of sale, or invoice. Colton did so with intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct. It was
Bolton's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct and cause the result. It was Ms first deer. The
)rotected wildlife, the deer, which was captured, injured or destroyed was a trophy animal.
The parties disagreed on the degree to which the minor must know of the wrongfulness of his conduct to
form the requisite intent. Nothing in the definition of "willful" requires scienter. Willful, when applied to the
ntent with which an act is done or omitted, implies a willingness to commit the act. It does not require an intent
;o violate the law or to injure another or acquire any advantage. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993).
Mien more is required, the legislature so states, for example:
UCA 23-20-27. Alteration of license, permit, tag or certificate a misdemeanor.
Any person who at any time alters or changes in any manner, with intent to defraud, any license,
permit, tag or certificate of registration issued under provisions of this code or action of the
Wildlife Board is guilty of a misdemeanor.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the minor did commit wanton destruction of protected and
trophy wildlife in violation of UCA §23-20-4 and Section 23-20-3(1), a third degree felony. The disposition or
sentencing will be stayed for a period of thirty (30) days within which time the minor may file a written notice
of appeal. If appealed, the disposition will be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. If the matter is not
appealed, a dispositional hearing shall be set after thirty (30) days has elapsed. This matter was transferred to
the Eighth District Juvenile Court for "adjudication and disposition". If and when appropriate, disposition will
occur in the Eighth District rather than in the First District Juvenile Court.
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TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 53 > § 1 1 5 1

§ 1151. Indian country defined
Release date: 2004-08-06
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title,
the term "Indian country", as used in this chapter, means
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a
state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO—-

State of Utah/
Plaintiff and Respondent,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication)

v.
Manuel Lucero,

Case No. 860213-CA

Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Billings, Garff and Greenwood.
PER CURIAM:

AUG £T 1987
8feO£/3-CA
Timothy M. bhea
Glerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeal*

Defendant Manual Lucero appeals his conviction of making
false material statements, a second degree felony under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-502 (1978). He alleges that because he is an Indian
and associates with the Ute Indian Tribe, and because the crime
was committed in "Indian country/1 the state court is deprived of
jurTsdiction over him.
Appellant had the burden to persuade the^ trial court that he
was an "Indian" within the intended purview o'f 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152
-53. According to the record/ this he failed to do. Such facts
which may be relevant, but evidence of which is absent here,
include: preponderance of Indian blood, recognition by the
federal government or by an organized tribe; and recognized
racial status. Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77 (Wyo. 1982);
Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okl. Cr. 1982); cf. U.S. v.
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.), cert, den. 444 U.S.
859 (1979); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 2-3 (1942).
Additionally, in his brief on appeal, appellant does not
support his factual claims with any citation to the record on
appeal, as required by R. Utah Ct.App. 24(a). References to the
record are entirely absent from appellant's statement of facts as
well as the argument section of his brief. In the absence of
proper citations to the record supporting appellant's contentions
on appeal, we presume regularity of the proceedings below and
affirm the trial court. State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 757 (Utah
1982); State v. Steaaell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983); State v.
Sutton, 707 P.2d 681, 683 (Utah 1985); State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d
287 (Utah 1986); cf. Trees v. Lewis, 56 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 8 (1986).

Appellant has the responsibility to marshal for this Court
those pertinent references to the record that support his
contentions on appeal. We will not undertake a complete review
of the multiple volume record to search out error when appellant
fails to do so.
We view the evidence in the record as supporting the trial
court's determination that defendant is not an Indian for
purposes of §§ 1152-53.
Defendant's conviction is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION by depositing the same in the United
States mail, postage prepaid to the following:
D. Aron Stanton/ Esq.
D. Aron Stanton & Associates
Route 1/ Box 1663
Roosevelt/ UT 84066
David L. Wilkinson
Attorney General
Earl F. Dorius
Michael M. Quealy
Assistant Attorneys General
B U I L D I N G
MAIL
DATED this 27th day of August/ 1987.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT .OF UTAH
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TIMPANOGOS TRIBE, Snake Band df
Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory,
Plaintiff,

1

ORDER

vs. ..

KEVIN CONWAY, Assistant Director, Utah
Department of Natural Resources, Division of
Wildlife Resources,

.

CaseNo.2:00-CV-734TC

Defendant,

and

UTE INDIAN TREE OF THE UINTAH
AND OURAY RESERVATION,
Defendant-Intervenor.

This matter is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by
Defendant Kevin Conway, Assistant Director of the State of Utah's Division of Wildlife
Resources, and Defehdant-Intervenor Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation
(collectively "Defendants").
This case deals with the priority of hunting,fisMng,and gathering rights on the Ute
Indian Tribe's Uintah and Ouray Reservation ("Reservation") in the State of Utah. Plaintiff, the

&

self-proclaimed Timpanogos Tribe, Snake Band of Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory,
maintains in its Complaint that ithas the right to issue hunting, fishing, and gathering permits.to
its members for use on the Reservation without interference from the Ute Indian Tribe or the
State of Utah. It asserts this right based on its claim that its members are descendants, of the
aboriginal Timpanogos band of Indians in Utah, which existed on the Reservation land before
either the Ute Tribe or the Reservation were established. Plaintiff further alleges that the
Timpanogos band of Indians in Utah was Shoshone, not Ute, and that it maintained independence
as a Shoshone tribe before and after the Ute Tribe and the Reservation were established.
Accordingly, Plaintiff claims that its members have superior aboriginal rights in the land's
natural resources.
Defendants do not recognize the Plaintiff's status as a tribe. Rather, they contend that the
aboriginal Timpanogos band of Indians was Ute, not Shoshone, and that it merged into the
Uintah Ute band of Indians (precursor to the Ute Tribe) in 1865. As a result of the merger,
Defendants claim that the aboriginal Thnpanogos band ceased to maintain an identity .
independent of the Ute Tribe and that the Ute Tribe has exclusive jurisdiction to issue pennits for
hunting,fishing,and gathering on the Reservation. Defendants also claim that the State of Utah
has the right to prosecute individuals who are caught hunting, fishing, or gathering on the
Reservation without a permit issued by the Ute Tribe.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment seeks dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint with
prejudice and judgment in Defendants' favor on their Joint Counterclaim (which is essentially a
mirror image of Plaintiff s claims). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED.
2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe, Snake Band of Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory
("Timpanogos Tribe") is not a federally-recognized Indian tribe. Nevertheless, Timpanogos
Tribe claims aboriginal rights on land in Utah for its members, specifically the right to issue
hunting, fishing, and gathering permits to its members in the area known as the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation or Uintah Valley Reservation ('^Reservation") without interference from the State of
Utah or the Ute Indian Tribe ("Ute Tribe"). As the basis for its claims, the Timpanogos Tribe
alleges that its members are Shoshone, not Ute, and that it has the right to issue permits because,
it alleges, its members are the "Indians ... for whom the [Reservation] was set apart." (Am.
Verified Compl. fff 12-13.) It further alleges that its'members, allegedly ancestors of the
aboriginal Shoshone in Utah, have the right to hunt, fish, and gather on the Reservation free from
prosecution by the State for hunting, fishing, or gathering without a permit issued by the State or
theUteTribe.
The Ute Tribe asserts that it, not Timpanogos Tribe, has the exclusive right to issue*
permits for hunting, fishing and gathering on the Reservation and that permits issued by the
Timpanogos Tribe are not valid. The State of Utah asserts that the Timpanogos Tribe does not
have the authority to issue such permits. Further, it does not recognize the Timpanogos Tribeissued permits as valid and intends to prosecute (or already has prosecuted) anyone (including
members of the Timpanogos Tribe) for hunting,fishing,or gathering within the Reservation
without a valid permit.
The Defendants claim that the Timpanogos Tribe is trying to re-write history The State
3.

and the Ute Tribe assert that the Timpanogos Tribe1 was actually one of five bands of Utes that
merged to form the Uintah Utes, who later, along with the Uncompahgre and White River Bands
of Utes, joined together to form what is known today as the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation. The Ute Tribe claims exclusive jurisdiction over the Reservation, which
jurisdiction is exercised by the Tribal Business Committee, the Ute Tribe's elected governing
body, through the Ute Tribe Constitution*
In support of their argument, the Defendants point to a series of bindings of Fact** in two
1957 Indian Claims Commission ('ICC") decisions in the matter of Uintah Ute Indians of Utah
v. United States, that, Defendants allege, conclusively establish that the Timpanogos merged
with the Uintah Utes and thereafter ceased to exist independently of the Ute Tribe. See Uintah
Ute Indians of Utah v. United States, Docket No. 44 (ICC Feb. 21,1957), attached as Ex. 2 to
Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Sumin. J. (hereinafter 'Docket No. 44"); Uintah Ute
Indians of Utah v. United States. Docket No. 45 (ICC Feb. 21,1957), attached as Ex. 3 to Defs/
Br. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. (hereinafter "Docket No. 45").
Obviously, the factual findings of ICC are at odds with the claims the Timpanogos Tribe
makes in this case. Pointing to the ICC decisions, the Defendants assert that the Timpanogos
Tribe's, claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. But
Timpanogos Tribe contends, among other things, that the Ute Tribe may not rely on the ICC
decisions as precedent because of a. 1960 stipulation between the Ute Tribe and the United States
stating that the "final judgment [in the two 1957 ICC decisions]... shall not be construed as an

defendants do not concede that the Timpanogos are a tribe. (See Defs.' Mot. at 2 n.l.)
4

admission of either party, for the purpose of precedent or argument, in any other case." See PL's '•
Mem. in Opp'n to Mot for Summ. J. at 15-16 (quoting Apr. 22,1960 Stipulation for Entry of .
Final Judgment in the case of Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. United States, attached as Ex. A to
PL's Mem.).
In addition to their issue preclusion defense, the Defendants submitted two expert reports
purporting to set forth the history of the Ute Tribe and the.relationship of the Timpanpgos to the
Utes. (See Expert Report of Floyd A. O'Neii, Ph.D. (Historian), attached as Ex, 4 "to Defs.'
Mem. in.Supp. of Mot for Summ. J.; Expert Report of Joel Janetski, Ph.D. (Anthropologist and
Archaeologist), attached as Ex. 5 to Defs/ Man. in Siipp.) Both experts conclude that the
Timpanogos merged with the Utes many years ago, that presently there is no separate tribe
known as the Timpanogos Tribe, that the Timpanpgos are Utes, not Shoshone, and that the
Timpanogos, other than as members of the Ute Tribe, have no independent rights on the
Reservation. (See id. at.2.) Both of Defendants' experts opine that historical, anthropological,
and archaeological documentation shows, that Plaintiffs'' allegations are simply wrong. (See
O'Neii Expert Report at 2 ("The historical evidence is all to the contrary."); Janetski Expert t
Report at 2 ("There is no anthropological, archaeological or historical evidence that supports •
such claims.9*).) They also conclude that the ICC Findings of Fact in the 1957 decisions are fiilly
supported by the historical recordand are accurate. (6'Neil Expert Report at 3'r Janetski Expert
Report at 2.)
Timpanogos Tribe did not submit its own expert reports in rebuttal, but it did submit
affidavit testimony and other documentation in an effort to rebut the conclusions of the
Defendants* experts. Defendants maintain that because Timpanogos Tribe did not submit an
5

expert witness report in rebuttal, as a matter of law the Plaintiff cannot prevail over the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. According to the Defendants, the issues raised are
beyond the experience of the ordinary layperson and therefore require expert testimony. That is,
the Defendants contend that because two expert witnesses came to a conclusion favoring the
position of the Defendants, and because Timpanogos Tribe did not present contrary evidence in
the forin of an expert report, Defendants ate per se entitled to summary judgment.
The court analyzes each set of arguments in turn below. •
ANALYSIS
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the entry of summary judgment "if the
pleadings, depositions, answers tp interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. m Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,250-51 (1986); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc.. 144 R3d 664,670
(10th Cir. 1998), ''The mere existence of a scintilla of evidencein support of the plaintiffs
position will be insufficient [to overcome a motion for summary judgment]; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at
252. See also Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co.» 181 F3d 1171,1175 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Amere
scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's theory does not create a genuine issue of
material fact").

I

6

Defendants' Collateral Estoppel/Issue Preclusion Defense
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "'[w]hen an issue of
ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be'
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit"' United States v. Botefuhr. 309 F.3d
1263,1282 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson. 397 U.S. 436,443 (1970)). The
Defendants bear the burden of establishing the four elements of issue preclusion. Adams v..
Kinder-Morgan. Inc.. 340 F.3d 1083,1093 (10th Cir. 2003). Those elements are: "'(I) the issue
previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior
action has been fully adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is
invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) theparty against
whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior
action."' Botefuhr. 309 F.3dat 1282 (quoting Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190,1197 (10th
Cir. 2000)). .
Thelessential issue in this case is whether the members of thie Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe
are actually ancestors of the Timpanogos, one of five historic Ute bands, and whether that band
merged into the Uintah Ute Band of Indians, which then ultimately became the Ute Tribe for
whom the Reservation was set aside. The 1957 ICC decisions addressed similar, if not identical,
factual issues regarding'aboriginal title to the Reservation and the make-up of the Uintah Ute
Band through a determination of which smaller Indian bands merged into the larger Uintah Band.
For example, the ICC found that the Shoshone and Utes were "separate and distinct." (Docket
No. 44 at Finding of Fact No. 5.) The ICC also found that the Timpanogos merged into the
Uintah Utes in 1865. (Id at Finding of Fact No. 4; Docket No. 45 at Finding of Fact No. 3.) The
7 '

. ICC found that the Uintah Utes band, along with the Uncompahgre and White River Bands* of
Utes, occupied the Reservation and are'now known as the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation. (Docket No. 44 at p. 32.) All of these issues are before this court.
The parties in the ICC litigation were the United States and the Ute Tribe. The State was
not involved in the litigation, but it appears to agree with and rely upon the findings of fact issued
by the ICC in the 1957 decisions. The question becomes whether Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe
was a party to the 1957 litigation or was a party in privity with the Ute Tribe in 1957.
Defendants contend that Timpanogos Tribe was a party to the litigation (through the Ute Tribe)
because the Timpanogos merged into the Ute Tribe in 1865. But this begs the question facing
the court now and presents a circular argument fi.e;. the Defendants' privity argument assumes
the'very fact it must prove - that the Plaintiff actually merged with and became part of the Ute
Tribe in 1865, thereby ceasing to maintain an independent identity after that point).
Given the unique circumstances of this case, the court finds that the Defendants have .
failed to establish the third element of issue preclusion! Accordingly, the Timpanogos Tribe is
not collaterally estopped by the ICC decisions from raising the issues now before the court.2

2

The court does not agree with the Timpanogos Tribe's argument that the 1960
Stipulation between the U.S. and the Ute Tribe (in which the parties finally settled the litigation
and agreed that thefinaljudgment of the ICC "shall not be construed as an admission of either
party, for the purpose of precedent or argument, in any other case" (Ex. A. to PL's Opp'n Mem.))
prevents the Ute Tribe from relying on the ICC decisions as precedent See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp
Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship. 513 U.S. 18,26-27 (1994) ('"Judicial precedents are*
presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely theproperty of private litigants and should stand unless a court finds that the public interest would be
served by a vacatur,'") (internal citation omitted). In any event, Timpanogos Tribe's argument
does not affect the State's right to cite to the ICC decisions, because the State was not a party to
the Stipulation. Further, as noted above, the court is not allowing the Defendants to rely on the
ICCfindingsof fact as evidence,
.
8

Nor will the court take judicial notice of the ICC Findings of Fact, as the Defendants
suggest it should,3 because that would essentially undermine the doctrine of collateral estoppel'
and be contrary to the Federal Rules of Evidence.. Rule 201 provides that "[a] judicially noticed
fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned/' Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). See
" also Tavlor v. Charter Med Corp.. 162 F.3d 827, 829-30 (5th Cir. 1998) ("court cannot take
judicial notice of the factual findings of another court... because (1) suchfindingsdo not
constitute facts 'not subject to reasonable dispute' within the meaning of Rule 201; and (2) 'were
[it] permissible for a court to take judicial notice pf a fact merely because it had been found to be.
true in some other action, the doctrine of collateral- estoppel would be superfluous.'") (internal
citations omitted); General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp.* 128 F.3d 1074,1082
n.6 (7th Cir. 1997) ("courts generally cannot take notice of findings of fact from other
proceedings for the truth asserted therein because thesefindingsare disputable and usually are
disputed."); Meredith v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 18 F.3d 890, 895 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing to Fed.
R. Evid 201(b), and noting that taking judicial notice of anything but a '"universal truth"
established by common knowledge, or "certain facts, which from their nature are not properly the
subject of testimony," would be improper). Indeed, Defendants essentially admit the facts at
issue in this case are not common knowledge, because they argue that the subject necessarily *
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See Defs/ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 12 (quoting language in Havasupai
Tribe v. United States. 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990), aflPd, 943 F.2d 32(9th Cir. 1991),
which said that the "ICC proceedings... are an appropriate subject for judicial notice")..
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requires expert testimony, Besides, it is clear that the factual issues before the ICC were subject
to reasonable dispute and were determined after consideration of much documentary evidence,
• This creates a potential problem for the Defendants, because Defendants' Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts relies in part on the ICC Findings of Fact as evidentiary support for
their position. fSee.e.g.. Deft.* Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.' at 5-12,) But Defendants also
rely on their expert reports, which do support Defendants' statement of facts.
Expert Evidence
Plaintiffs Failure to Present Expert Rebuttal Evidence
. To the extent that Defendants are contending that because the Plaintiffhas failed to
submit expert rebuttal evidence, as a matter of law Defendants are entitled to summary judgment,
the court disagrees. The cases cited by Defendants - Randolph v. Collectramatic. Mc, 590 F.2d
844, 846, 848 (10th Cir. 1979), and Keller v. Albright 1 F. Supp. 2d 1279,1281-82 (D. Utah

"

1997), affU 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998) - d o not support such an argument.
Rather, the issue is whether the Plaintiffhas presented admissible evidence that creates a
genuine issue of material fact that must be tried by a jury.
Defendants' Expert Evidence and Plaintiffs Rebuttal Evidence
Defendants' Evidence
Defendants' experts provide strong evidence to support Defendants' position.4 (See
Expert Report of Floyd A. O'Neil, Ph.D. (Historian), attached as Ex. 4 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. '
of Mot. for Summ. J.; Expert Report of Joel Janetski, Ph.D. (Anthropologist and Archaeologist),

4

The Plaintiffhas not challenged the qualifications or methodology of the Defendants'
expert witnesses.
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attached as Ex. 5 to Defs/ Mem. in Supp.) Both experts conclude that the Timpanogos merged
with the Utes many years ago, that presently there is no separate tribe known as the Timpanogos
Tribe, that the Timpanogos are Utes, not Shoshone, and that the Timpanogos, other than as
members of the Ute Tribe, have no rights on the Reservation,' See.id. at 2. Both of Defendants'
experts opine that the historical, anthropological, and archaeological documentation shows that
Plaintiffs* allegations are simply wrong. (See 6'Neil Expert Report at 2 ("The historical
evidence is all to the contrary."); Janetski Expert Report at 2 ('There is no anthropological,archaeological or historical evidence that supports such claims.").) They also conclude that the
ICC Findings of Fact in the .1957 decisions are fully supported by the historical record and are
accurate. (O'Neil Expert Report at 3; Janetski Expert Report at 2.)
Plaintiff's Evidence
In opposition, Plaintiff submitted the following evidence: Affidavit of Mary Meyer (Ex; E
to PL's Mem. In Opp'n (hereinafter "Opp'n Menu")), Affidavit of Dave Montes (Ex. J to Opp'n '
Mem.), an excerpt from the 1776 Dominguez-Escalante Journal (Ex. G to Opp'n Mem.), the
October 3,1861 Executive Order setting aside the Uintah Valley Reservation (Ex. H to Opp'n
Mem.), an 1863 map purporting to show the boundaries of Shoshone territories (attached to the
decision in Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States. 95 Ct. CI. 642 (1942),
affd 324 U.S. 335 (1945), and one OT more 1863 United States treaties with the Shoshone) (Ex.
L to Opp'n Mem.), a copy of the unratified June 8,1865 Spanish Fork Treaty (Ex. I to Opp'n
Mem.), the Utah State Tax Commission Apr. 27, 2000 Decision in the matter ofMarvMeverv.
Customer Serv. Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n (Ex, C to Opp'n Mem.), the State's PreHearing Memorandum in the same Utah State Tax Commission matter (Ex. D to Opp'n Mem.), a
11

list of Timpanogos Tribe membership eligibility requirements (Ex. F to Opp'n Mem.), and a"
Judgment issuedby the Ute Tribal Court (Ex. K to Opp'n Mem.). •
The Mary Meyer and Dave Montes Affidavits
In her affidavit, Mary Meyer states, among other things, that she is a member of the
Timpanogos Tribe'and presently is its Chief Executive Officer. (MeyesfAff. ff 2-3.) She also
makes the following assertion: "I descend from Shoshonean and Northern iPaiute Ancestors. I
am not Ute. I have no Ute Indian blood, nor have I ever been enrolled with the Ute Indian Tribe,
a Federal Corporation." QMLf8.) Similarly, Dave Montes* in his affidavit, states that he is a
Timpanogos Indian rather than a Ute, that he is a member of the Timpanogos Tribe, that he has
never been a Ute Tribal member, that his children, mother, grandfather Leo Pritchett, and great
grandfather Chief Tabby were never Ute Tribal members, that the Uintah Valley Reservation has
always been his home, and that his great grandfather "spent most of his time in the Rock Creek
area and always claimed the Wasatch Front as his home." (Montes Aff. flf 1,3-5, 7, 8-9.) *
Ms. Meyer's and Mr. Montes' personal statements offer nothing more than anecdotal.
information and are not relevant to the questions facing the court, particularly the question of
whether the Timpanogos band of Indians merged with th$ Ute Indian Tribe, thereby ceasing to
exist as an independent entity, §ee United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States. 253 F,3d
543, 548 (10th Cir. 2001):
[The United Tribe of Shawnee Indians' CUTSI")] argument assumes the very
factual issue at the heart of this litigation. UTSI can only prevail on its contention
if we accept its bare assertion that it is the present-day embodiment of the
Shawnee Tribe. The only evidence even arguably offered by UTSI to support this
proposition is the fact that UTSI is based on land patented to Mr^ Oyler's ancestor
by the Treaty. While this fact may establish that Mr. Oyler's ancestor was a
member of the Shawnee tribe and that Mr. Oyler is therefore a descendant of a
12

tribal member, it says nothing about whether UTSI has maintained its identity
with the Shawnee tribe and has continued to exercise that tribe's sovereign
authority up to the present day.
.
Id at 548 (emphasis added).
The Utah State Tax Commission Proceeding
Plaintiff raises a collateral estoppel argument when it relies on documents in the April 27,
2000 Utah State Tax Commission case of Marv Mever v. Customer Serv. Div. of Utah State Tax
Comm'n (Appeal No. 98-1181), to support its position. (See PL's Opp'n Mem. at 7-8,10,12, •
14,17-22; Ex. C to PL's Opp'n Mem (Final Decision of Utah State Tax Commission); Ex. D to
PL's Opp'n Mem. (State of Utah's Pre-Hearing Memorandum in tax proceeding).) According to
Plaintiff, .
The Timpanogos Tribe was historically recognized as a separate and distinct tribe
and was of Shoshone [descent].,.. Moreover, recently in the case of Meyer v.
Utah State Tax Comm %... the State of Utah and the Utah Tax Commission
recognized Mary Meyer, the Chief Executive Officer of the Timpanogos Tribe, as
"a member of the San Pitch [B]and of Timpanogos [T]ribe of Snake lhdians[,]"
"an Indian member of the Shoshone Nation[,]" and sinot of Ute ancestryf.]"
.. .This recognition is prima facie evidence of the Plaintiffs distinct identity
• [today].
' (PL's Opp'n Mem. at 7-8 (internal citations omitted).) In the Mever case, the issue was whether
. Ms. Meyer was exempt from the requirement to pay jproperty taxes on her car because she was an
Indian (non-Ute) living on the Reservation.
Plaintiffs collateral estoppel argument is not persuasive here for a number of reasons.
.First, the Ute Tribe was not a party to the litigation, so at a minimum, only one of two
Defendants would, in theory, be collaterally estopped.
Second, the issue of Ms. Meyer's ancestry was not actually litigated. That is, the State of
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Utah had no reason to dispute Ms. Meyer's assertion that she is not a Ute, because her assertion
meant that the State would prevail on its claim for property tax from a non-tribal member; As
Defendants note, "Ms. Meyer could have said she was of any ethnicity, heritage, or group other
than Ute and the State would have had no reason to contest her' claim." (Defs.' Reply Mem. at
9.) Accordingly, the court disagrees with Plaintiffs overly broad statement that determination of
'*Ms. Meyer's ancestry [as a Shoshone] was necessary to the Utah State Tax Commission's •
judgment" (Seg PL's Opp'n Mem. at 20.) '
Third, the issue actually litigated in the tax commission case was "whether the state may
tax personal property of an Indian who lives on a reservation, but is not ain enrolled member of
. the governing tribe." (Utah State Tax Comm'n Final Decision at 6 (Ex..C to PL's Opp'n
Mem.).) The Mever decision assumes the truth of the proposition being challenged by the
Plaintiff in this matter, namely that the Ute Tribe is the exclusive governing tribe of the
Reservation, (See id. at 5-7; see also State of Utah's Pre-Hearing Mem. in Meyer at 2 ("The Ute
Tribe is the governing Tribe over the lands of the Ute Indian Reservation.") (attached as Ex. D to
PL's Opp'n Mem.).). The Utah State Tax Commission administrative court did not decide the
same issue facing the court today.
Finally, as noted by the Defendants, <cthe Commission would hot have jurisdiction to .
adjudicate the Timpanogos' existence." See, e.g.. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway. 286 F:3d 1195,
1203 (10th Cir. 2002) ('It is rudimentary that 'Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be
extinguished only with federal consent' and that the termination of the protection that federal
law; treaties, and statutes extend to Indian occupancy is 'exclusively the province of federal
. law."') (quoting Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe. 442 U.S. 653, .670-71 (1979)),
14

The 1776 Dominguez-Escalante Journal, the 1861 Executive Order,
1863 Map of Shoshone Territory, and the Unratified 1865 Spanish
Fork Treaty
Plaintiff cites to these historical documents (Exs. G, H, I, and L to PL's Opp'n Mem.) to
support its position that the Timpanogos Indians historically were recognized as a separate and
distinct tribe of Shoshone descent that was induced to inhabit (and did inhabit) the area which
became known as the Reservation. (See PL's Opp'n Mem. at 7-10,12-14,26.) The Plaintiff
claims that these documents establish its members' aboriginal rights and that such aboriginal
rights are superior to the Ute Tribe's rights and jurisdiction.
The excerpt from the Dominguez-Escalante Journal notes the characteristics and location
of the Timpanogos band of Indians in what was then Utah Territory. {Journal Excerpt (Ex. G to
PL's Opp'n Mem.).) Plaintiff cites to this for the proposition that the "Timpanogos Tribe was •
historically recognized as a separate and distinct tribe and was of Shoshone [descent]." (Pl/s
Opp'n Mem. at 7-8,12-13.) But the excerpt from the Journal makes no mention of Shoshone
Indians. Moreover, it is not disputed that a separate Timpanogos band existed in 1776. (See
Defs.' Reply Mem, at 5-6.) This piece of evidence does nothing to contradict the Defendants'
evidence that the Timpanogos band merged into the Uintah Ute band of Indians in 1865 and
ceased to maintain an identity independent of the Ute Tribe.
The 1861 Executive Order (later approved by an 1864 Act of Congress) set aside a
reservation in the Uintah Valley "for the permanent settlement and exclusive occupation of such
of the different tribes of Indians of said [Utah] territory as may be induced to inhabit the same."
(Oct. 3,1861 Exec. Order (Ex. H to Pi's Opp'n Mem.); Act of May 5,1864, ch. 77,13 Stat. 63,
. § 2.) Plaintiff cites to this in support of the unremarkable proposition that the Uintah Valley
15

Reservation was set aside as an Indian reservation by President Lincoln. (PI. 's Opp'n Mem. at •
13.) Plaintiff then makes the inference, in conjunction with citations to the 1776 Journal and an
unratified 1865 treaty (discussed below), that "it is undisputed and historically documented that
the Timpanogos Tribe constituted one of the 'different tribes of Indians of said [Utah] territory'
for whom the Uintah Reservation was established*" (IdLat26.) At most, giving the Plaintiff
benefit of the doubt, this tends to show that the Reservation was established for more than one
tribe, all of which would co-exist and have equal rights on the Reservation. Even if Plaintiff is
arguing that it be allowed to "co-exist" with the Ute Tribe on the Reservation, it ignores later •
historical events which suggest that the Utes were the only Indians for whom the reservation was
set aside. For example, under the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18,1934,48 Stat. 984, the
current Ute Tribe was formed by combining the Uintah, White River, and Uncompahgre b&nds of
Ute Indians in 1936. Also, in 1937, the Constitution and By-Laws of the Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation w;ere established with approval of the United States. See also
Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. United States. 28 Fed. CI. 768, 784-85 (Fed. CL 1993) (stating that'
"aboriginal title provides a given tribe with rights as against all except the sovereign" and "a tribe
must prove exclusive possession of a parcel..,. [M]ixed use of a given parcel 'precludes the
establishment of any aboriginal title***).
The 1863 map cited by Plaintiff purports to show Shoshone territory in Utah. Plaintiff
relies on it to show that Shoshone Territory included the land where the Reservation was
established. But, in the court opinion to which it was attached as an exhibit, the court notes that
the drawn boundaries were approximate. See Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United
States: 95 Ct. CI. 642 (Ct CL 1942). And the purpose of the 1863 treaties between the Shoshone
•
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and the United States, for which the map was originally drawn, was to create peaceful relations
between the tribe and the government, not to negotiate or establish any right or title to the
territory indicated on the map.
[T]he information [gathered by the agents of the government] as to the locations
of various bands of these Indians and the area in which they lived and over which
they roamed and hunted... was general in character and indefinite as to
boundaries of specific areas and, also, as to specific bands or individual Indians of
specific tribes
The treaties [with the Shoshone] were intended to be, and we
think they are, treaties of peace, and amity because the Government had very little
reliable information as to the territory actually occupied by these [Shoshone]
Indians. •
Id. A map of approximate boundaries, by itself or in conjunction with the rest of Plaintiffs
evidence, is simply not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact in this case.
The Plaintiff also cites to the unratified 1865 Spanish Fork Treaty 'Vith the Utah,
Yampah Ute, Pah-Vant, Sanpete Ute, Tim-P-Nogs and Cum-Nm-Bah Bands of the Utah
Indians." (Treaty (Ex. I to PL's Opp'n Mem.) at 1 (emphasis added).) The Treaty provides in
relevantpart that the Timpanogos were a band of Indians in Utah Territory who were induced to
"remove to and settle upon" the reservation described as "the entire valley of the Uintah River" .
within Utah Territory extending on both sides of said river to the crest of the first range of
contiguous mountains on each side." QdL at 1-2.) Plaintiff cites to this in support of the
proposition that the Timpanogos Band was distinct and did not merge with the Utes, because, it
appears, the Timpanogos Band was represented by a separate signatory to the treaty. Aside from
the fact that the treaty was never ratified (the Senate rejected it in 1869 so it is not a binding
document), it also contains language that contemplates giving the group of bands as one entity
exclusive use and occupation rights of a single piece of land. Specifically, the Treaty provides
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that one undivided tract of land is "reserved for the exclusive use and occupation of the said
tribes/' (Treaty art. H (Ex. I to PL's Opp'n Mem.) (emphasis added).) This language is
inconsistent with the Timpanogos Tribe's contention that the Reservation was set aside for it, not
for the Ute Tribe. (See^e^ Am. CompL If 12.)
Timpanogos Tribe Eiigibffify Requirements and the 1979 Ute Tribal
Council Decision
The fact that a modern day entity calling itself Timpanogos Tribe maintains the eligibility
requirements set forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit F does not create a genuine issue of material fact..
The court must look to historical evidence to make its determination.
• In the 1970 Ute Tribal Council decision (attached as Exhibit K to PL's Opp'n Mean.), the
Ute Tribal Council decided that certain individuals, some of whom were apparently ancestors of
affiant Dave Montes, did not meet the requirements for Ute Tribe membership. The tribal
court's holding does not tell us anything other than the fact that certain relatives of Mr. Montes
were not members of the Ute Tribe. Thisidoes not support Plaintiffs claims. Plaintiff asks the
court to make unreasonable inferences and leap to the conclusion that because Mr. Montes and
his ancestors are not Ute, the Plaintiff, whose members include Mr. Montes, is a Shoshone tribe
in existence since aboriginal times and for whom the Reservation was set aside. The court will.
not make that leap, nor will it allow a jury to do so.
In short, Plaintiff has presented nothing more than a "mere scintilla" of evidence, which
is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co,. 181
F3d 1171,1175 (10th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment
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ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
DATED this pjT

day of January, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

-3e^4 (lo^v^OuM
TENA CAMPBELL
United States District Judge
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